Survey of North Carolina Case Law: Workmen\u27s Compensation by Thorpe, Philip C.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1966
Survey of North Carolina Case Law: Workmen's
Compensation
Philip C. Thorpe
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thorpe, Philip C., "Survey of North Carolina Case Law: Workmen's Compensation" (1966). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 2313.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2313
1966] SURVEY OF NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW 1069
his witnesses from the courtroom to a luncheon establishment. On
this motion having been made, the trial judge conducted an imme-
diate inquiry, and from this it appeared that the plaintiff, his witness
and the juror had not discussed the case but talked about fishing and
corned herring. Several other jurors and the sheriff had eaten at
the same luncheon place. The sheriff testified the juror in question
was a truthful person and had a good reputation. The juror him-
self said that if he had not seen the plaintiff at the lunch hour, his
verdict would have been the same. On this evidence the trial judge
found the encounter had been a casual one and that it had not
affected the verdict. Motion of defendant was accordingly denied.
In affirming the action of the trial judge, Justice Sharp, for the
Court, declared that the granting or denial of defendant's motion
for a mistrial was in the discretion of the trial judge and under




INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF JURISDICTIONAL
FACTS
The Court decided two cases that make clear the proper pro-
cedures respecting findings of jurisdictional facts by superior court
judges.' In Askew v. Leonard Tire Co.' the superior court judge
overruled the exceptions filed to the Industrial Commission's find-
ings of jurisdictional facts,3 but without making independent find-
ings of such facts. On appeal the defendant argued that prior
decisions in Beach v. McLean4 and Aylor v. Barnes5 necessitated
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
'Burns v. Riddle, 265 N.C. 705, 144 S.E.2d 847 (1965); Askew v.
Leonard Tire Co., 264 N.C. 168, 141 S.E.2d 280 (1965).
' See note 1 supra. Burns was based upon the decision in Askew. See
Hanft, Administrative Law, North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 889
(1966), for further discussion of this case.
'The jurisdictional question was whether an employment relationship
existed.
'219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E.2d 515 (1941).
'242 N.C. 223, 87 S.E.2d 269 (1955).
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independent finding. 0 The Court refused to so hold and established
guidelines for findings of jurisdictional facts.
At present, the following rules apply. The Court still holds that
the Industrial Commission's findings of jurisdictional facts are not
conclusive even though they are supported by competent evidence;7
thus the superior court judge may examine the record independent-
ly. The judge may refer to and affirm the Commission's findings
without making separate findings, at least as long as it is clear that
he examined the record independently and decided that the jurisdic-
tional facts were as found by the Commission. The Court intimated
in Askew that if counsel had requested independent findings, the
superior court would have been under an obligation to file them.
STATUTORY EMPLOYER IN "LOANED SERVANT" CASES
In Leggette v. J. D. McCotter, Inc.8 the Court held that an em-
ployee was employed by each of two employers. It affirmed a find-
ing of the Industrial Commission, which had been reversed by the
superior court, requiring the employers to split the payment of com-
pensation benefits between them. Leggette represents a departure
from prior decisions in "loaned servant" cases. It rests upon the
proposition that, in close cases, fairness requires both the general
and the special employer to be liable for compensation. It is clear
from the opinion that the Court does not mean to overrule earlier
cases in which the employee was clearly performing work solely for
the special employer.' Only where the employee's duties benefit both
employers, or arguably do so, will the Leggette rule apply.
"INJURY BY ACCIDENT"
In Lawrence v. Hatch Mill,"° the Court reaffirmed its recent
(since 1957) definition of the statutory term "injury by accident."'"
'In Pearson v. Peerless Flooring Co., 247 N.C. 434, 101 S.E.2d 301
(1958), the superior court specifically adopted the Industrial Commission's
findings as its own. This practice was approved, but was not followed in
Askew.
'Thus the Court has not moved away from the largely discredited juris-
dictional facts theory. See 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §
80.41, at 324 (1952) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]. For criticism of the
rule on the ground that almost all findings of fact are "jurisdictional" in
the sense that an absence of such facts places the matter outside the range
of those cases to which the compensation act applies.
8265 N.C. 617, 144 S.E.2d 849 (1965).
'See, e.g., Shapiro v. City of Winston-Salem, 212 N.C. 751, 194 S.E.
479 (1938).
'0 265 N.C. 329, 144 S.E.2d 3 (1965).IlN.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1965).
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In Lawrence plaintiff was removing a heavy object from a tool box
when he felt pain in his back. There was no evidence of unusual
twisting, lifting, or any other unusual or fortuitous occurrence.
Relying on several recent cases, the Court applied a rule requir-
ing proof of an external fortuitous incident before an injury may
be characterized as accidental.'
3
The "injury by accident" question has proved troublesome, par-
ticularly in cases involving hernias, heart attacks, and back in-
juries.14 North Carolina decisions reflect the problems in deciding
what is a compensable accidental injury. Prior to 1940, the statute
was construed to require an external, fortuitous occurrence.' 5 In
1940, the Court apparently reversed itself in Smith v. Cabarrus
Creamery Co.,' holding that an injury was accidental (1) if caused
by an external, fortuitous event, or (2) if the result itself was
unexpected.1 7 This rule was altered in 1957,18 and since then the
Court has required a fortuitous external occurrence in order for the
injury to be compensable.' Although Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n
Co-op.2" distinguished rather than overruled Smith, a review of the
cases decided after Smith and prior to Hensley shows that the
Court did not require that the injury be induced by an unusual
external event. In several cases, the testimony indicated that the
claimant was doing his usual work in his usual way.2 '
Hensley represented a return to a rule now in the minority in
"E.g., Pardue v. Blackburn Bros. Oil & Tire Co., 260 N.C. 413, 132
S.E.2d 747 (1963); Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 124
S.E.2d 109 (1962); Turner v. Burke Hosiery Mill, 251 N.C. 325, 111 S.E.2d
185 (1959).
" The test requires more than that the usual work was being done in
the usual way. Lawrence v. Hatch Mill, 265 N.C. 329, 330, 144 S.E.2d 3,
4 (1965).
1" See 1 LARSON § 37.30.
" E.g., Slade v. Willis Hosiery Mills, 209 N.C. 823, 184 S.E. 844 (1936);
Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434 (1935).
217 N.C. 468, 8 S.E.2d 231 (1940).
"'E.g., Beaver v. Crawford Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 82 S.E.2d 113
(1954) ; Glace v. Pilot Throwing Co., 239 N.C. 668, 80 S.E.2d 759 (1954) ;
Rice v. Thomasville Chair Co., 238 N.C. 121, 76 S.E.2d 311 (1953); Ed-
wards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N.C. 184, 41 S.E.2d 592 (1947).
18 Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Co-op., 246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E.2d 289 (1957).
See 37 N.C.L. REv. 378 (1958); 41 N.C.L. REv. 410 (1963).
1" Compare Hensley v. Farmers Fed'n Co-op., smpra note 18, with Searcy
v. Branson, 253 N.C. 64, 116 S.E.2d 175 (1960), and Keller v. Electric
Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 130 S.E.2d 342 (1963).
10246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E.2d 289 (1957).
"E.g., Beaver v. Crawford Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 82 S.E.2d 113
(1954); Glace v. Pilot Throwing Co., 239 N.C. 668, 80 S.E.2d 759 (1954).
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the United States.2' However, since the statute does not require an
external occurrence, the Court has alternative interpretations avail-
able. The problem is one of distinguishing between sudden failures
of the body (accidental injuries) and those requiring time to de-
velop (disease). By requiring proof of an external occurrence, the
Court has needlessly limited compensation coverage, overlooking its
own authorities to the contrary in the process.
MISCELLANEOUS
In Gibbs v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,13 plaintiff-employee
brought a third-party action against the defendant, pursuant to G.S.
§ 97-10.2. Defendant asserted a claim for indemnity or contribu-
tion against plaintiff's employer The Court held that such a claim
could not be joined in the employee's action.24 In Jones v. Myrtle
Desk Co.25 the employee was injured while doing personal work
on company time. Although company rules permitted employees to
do personal work, the employee had not obtained permission from
his foreman as required. The Court affirmed the Industrial Com-
mission's findings that plaintiff was not injured in the course of
his employment. This holding is clearly a proper result. It would
seem that the only situation in which compensation would be pay-
able when the employee's injury occurred while doing personal work
is where the personal work benefits the employer. At times a benefit
can be found in the educational value of personal work when the
employer benefits from the employee's attempts at self-improve-
ment.28 No such showing was made in Jones.
", See 1 LARsON § 38.00.23265 N.C. 459, 144 S.E.2d 393 (1965).
" See discussion of Gibbs in Thorpe, Torts-Part II, North Carolina
Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1047 (1966).
' 264 N.C. 401, 141 S.E.2d 632 (1965).
'"See 1 LARSON § 27.31(b).
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